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Abstract—The present research aimed at investigating the ways in which the argumentative strategies of 
advantage, disadvantage, threat, reality, and history have been applied to portray the issue of Iran’s nuclear 
program, actors, actions and events. To this end, a critical discourse analysis approach mainly based on 
Wodak’s discourse-historical approach was applied to 55 editorials of the New York Times, all dealing 
exclusively with Iran’s nuclear program. The results showed that the differential treatment given to the issue 
at hand was in line with the advocated policy of the paper to impose more sanctions on Iran to force the 
country to accept a comprehensive nuclear deal. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Inspired by critical discourse analysis, this study attempts to investigate the ideological portrayal of U.S. policies 
toward Iran’s nuclear program in the editorial section of an American newspaper, the New York Times (hereafter the 
NYT). The study focuses on whether the argumentative strategies contribute to a biased representation of Iranian nuke 
activities. Ideology is defined here as ‘the mental frameworks, language, concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and 
systems of representations that different groups use to understand and explain the workings of society’ (Hall, 1996, p.2). 
More significantly, ideologies are considered to function as ‘the basis of dominant group’s practices which justify, 
legitimate, or condone particular forms of power relations’ (van Dijk, 1991, 2006, 2008). 
Studying editorials is especially significant when analyzing the ideological role of news media because editorials are 
expressions of the broad ideological policies of the newspaper’s owners and managers (Bilal et. al, 2012). Unlike news 
discourse, editorials are conversations among a society’s economic and power elites’ (Henry & Tator, 2002, p.93). 
Critical discourse analysis is considered to be a tool for analyzing the ideologies of mass media for identifying social, 
economic, and historical power relations between dominant and subordinate groups (van Dijk, 1991, 1992, 1993; wodak, 
2001; Henry & Tator, 2002; Caldas-Coulthard, 2003; van Leeuwen, 2009). According to Herman and Chomsky (2002), 
mass media forms people’s norms and beliefs based on the social, political, and economic interests dominating the 
public. Thus, the media manages the public opinion to support the social interests of the leaders and society’s dominant 
ideology. The dominant ideology also tends to compel the rival beliefs, values, and worldviews that challenge the 
society’s worldview (knight & Dean, 1982). According to Wodak (2001), politicians as specific, not homogeneous 
group of elites, are shapers of specific public opinions that not only reflect anticipation of changes in public opinions, 
but also articulation of changing interests of specific social groups. So, the relationships between media, politics, and 
people are very complex. As Wodak (2001) claims, only interdisciplinary research will be able to make such complex 
relationships more transparent including discourse-historical approach as one form of CDA. 
One of the most remarkable issues of the last ten years or so has undeniably been Iran’s nuclear program. Different 
media have given various reporting to and interpretation of it. Alongside the political struggle between Iran and the west, 
there has been a verbal contention over this concern with some voices trying to account for Iran’s nuclear activities and 
others seeking to represent it as an act of disobedience. A few studies have focused on this issue so far (Izadi & 
Saghaie-Biria, 2007; Atai & Rezaie, 2009; Jones, 2010; Rasti & Sahragard, 2012; Rashidi & Rasti, 2012; Atai & 
Mozaheb, 2013). Inspired by discourse-historical approach, this study investigates the argumentative strategies through 
which the NYT, an American elite newspaper, tires to rationalize the bias against Iran’s nuke activities. “Within the 
argumentation theory, ‘topoi’ or ‘loci’ can be described as parts of argumentation that belong to the obligatory, either 
explicit or inferable, premises. According to Keinpointner (1992), they are content-related warrants or ‘conclusion 
rules’ that connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion, the claim. As such, they justify the transition from 
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the argument or arguments to the conclusion” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p.75). Inspired by Wodak’s discourse-historical 
approach and argumentation theory, the following questions are advanced: 
1) How are the argumentative strategies (topoi) implemented to portray events, agents, and policies about the Iran’s 
nuclear program? 
2) How do the political changes (i.e. American and Iranian presidential elections) influence the application of topoi in 
representing Iran’s nuke activities?  
II.  POLITICO-HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
Iran has had a nuclear program for nearly 50 years beginning with a research reactor purchased from the U.S. in 1959 
(Squassoni, 2006, p.1). The country ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. The treaty is an attempt to 
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and its technology, to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to 
advance the achievement of general and complete disarmament’ (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1970). 
After the Iranian revolution in 1979, a West German company which had undertaken the accomplishment of Bushehr 
nuclear plant repudiated the contract, and Iran’s attempts to finish the project came to grief (Rasti & Sahragard, 2012, 
p.733). The eight-year war with Iraq (Iran’s western neighbour) just two years after the revolution halted the resumption 
of nuclear sites. 
After the war, an opposition group (the National Council of Resistance of Iran) in August 2002 made known that Iran 
was practicing ‘undeclared nuclear activities’ (Squassoni, 2006). George W. Bush aligned Iran with an ‘axis of evil’ in 
his 2002 State of the Union address. Ever since Iran’s nuclear program has been in the foreground, with the West trying 
to restrict the country’s nuclear capabilities, and Iran insisting time and time again on the peaceful nature of its nuclear 
activities. 
Since 2003, IAEA Board of Governors and the EU-3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) undertook 
diplomatic negotiations with Iran about its nuclear program. On the question of whether Iran had a hidden nuclear 
weapons program, the IAEA's November (2003, p.10) report states that “it found no evidence that the previously 
undeclared activities were related to a nuclear weapons program, but also that it was unable to conclude that Iran's 
nuclear program was exclusively peaceful”. 
In Nov, 2004, based on ‘Paris Agreement’, Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment in exchange for renewed trade 
talks (Squassoni, 2006). In August 2005, after the June election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran's President, the 
country removed seals on its uranium enrichment equipment in Isfahan, which UK officials termed a violation of the 
Paris Agreement. Russia, China, and the U.S. joined the EU-3 and ‘P5+1’ formed in 2006. They intended to pursue Iran 
to suspend uranium enrichment through a combination of incentives and economic sanctions (Squassoni, 2006). 
Afterwards, a set of sanctions were imposed by U.N. Security Council including resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 
and 1835.   
After inauguration of President Obama, the U.S. and it allies announced, in July 2009, the need for constructive 
proposals by Iran otherwise it would face ‘criplling sanctions’ (Squassoni, 2006). Afterwards, sanctions and sabotage 
were employed by international community to impede Iran’s nuclear program (Kerr, 2012). According to Katzman 
(2015), the U.S. has employed covert actions such as Stuxnet computer virus that damaged many Iranian centrifuges as 
well as the killings of some Iranian nuclear scientists in order to slow down Iran’s program. 
In February 2010 the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran was a nuclear state. IAEA 
officials confirmed it has enriched uranium ‘up to 19.8%’ and issued a report scolding Iran “for failing to explain 
purchases of sensitive technology as well as secret tests of high-precision detonators and modified designs of missile 
cones to accommodate larger payloads” (IAEA, 2010, p.9). In April 2010, Tehran Declaration was signed by Iran, 
Brazil, and Turkey by which Iran agreed to send 2,600 pounds of uranium to Turkey in exchange for medically 
reprocessed uranium (Squassoni, 2006). 
In June 2013, Hassan Rouhani won the Iranian presidential election. P5+1 leaders declared that his election improved 
the possibility for a nuclear settlement (Katzman, 2015). In Nov 2013, the Geneva interim agreement, officially titled 
the Joint Plan of Action, was signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries. It consisted of a temporary freeze of portions 
of Iran's nuclear program in replace of decreased economic sanctions on Iran, as the countries were expected to achieve 
a long-term agreement. It represented the first formal agreement between the United States and Iran in 36 years. On 
Nov, 2014, the talks have been extended to finalize a comprehensive accord by June 30 (Katzman, 2015). 
III.  METHOD 
The methodology of this research is critical discourse analysis. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses are carried 
out. The decision is justified by a more in-depth analysis of the relevant data. As such, excerpts of the data are provided 
with the purpose of thick analysis. 
A.  Sample 
The data for the analysis in this study came from an American newspaper, the New York Times. It is an elite 
newspaper and among the largest media outlet in the U.S. Moreover, the NYT serves as intermedia for other news 
sources with regard to the coverage of international issues (Golan, 2006). A collection of 55 editorials published from 
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January 2010 to April 2015 was selected for the study. They were all on the subject of Iran’s nuclear program. The data 
was accessed through the newspaper’s website. The search key words were Iran’s nuclear program. The search yielded 
a total of 259 articles. The focus then was narrowed down to the most relevant articles regarding the time period of 
2010-2015 which resulted in a collection of 55 articles.  
B.  Data Analysis 
The data was analyzed based on the argumentative strategies (topoi) of advantage, disadvantage, threat, reality, and 
history proposed by Reisigl and Wodak (2001). According to topos of advantage or usefulness, “if an action will be 
useful then one should perform it”. This topos is categorized into three subtypes which include 1) to the advantage of all, 
2) to the advantage of us, and 3) to the advantage of them (p.75). Based on the topos of uselessness or disadvantage, “if 
existing situation or rulings do not help to reach the declared aim, they have to be changed” (p.75). Topos of threat or 
danger states that “if there are specific dangers and threats, one should do something against them” (p.77). Topos of 
reality can be paraphrased as: “the necessity of an action because the reality is as it is” (p.79). According to topos of 
history, “one should perform or omit a specific action in specific situation comparable with the historical example 
referred to”. In what follows some notable instances of each topos (i.e. argumentative strategy) are presented 
accompanied by the discussion of the purposes they serve. The discussion is enlightened by considering the effects of 
two important political events: 1) American presidential election in 2012 and 2) Iranian presidential election in 2013. 
IV.  RESULTS 
A.  Topos of Advantage or Usefulness 
The application of topos of advantage (see table I) consisted of two subcategories: first, those that were advantageous 
to us (U.S. and its allies) representing different means through which U.S. and its allies had tried to achieve their goal, 
halting Iran nuclear activity. The following extracts are typical of many ways employed by the newspaper to show the 
decisions made by president Obama like imposing tough sanctions on Iran and his attempts to persuade other countries 
to cooperate in what was assumed to be useful to us. The main point was achieving the goal through any possible ways 
such as sanctions, oil embargo, assassination, bombing, and cyber attacks, with no respect to such things as human 
rights or justice. 
Excerpt1 
If there is any good news in the I.A.E.A. report, it appears that Iran’s enrichment program is not advancing as fast as 
many feared — the result of the Stuxnet computer virus and sanctions that make it harder for Tehran to import needed 
materials from overseas. (NYT, June, 12, 2011) 
Second subcategory is the one advantageous to them (i.e. Iran) that is engaging in negotiations over its nuclear 
activities and accepting to stop enriching uranium in order to get free of the imposed sanctions. As it is shown in the 
excerpts, our advantage (i.e. U.S. and its allies) is supposed to be in direct opposition to their advantage (i.e. Iran) which 
creates an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ ideological dichotomy. 
Excerpt 2 
Negotiators offered fuel for a medical reactor and aircraft replacement parts if Iran agreed to stop enriching 
uranium to 20 percent purity — near bomb grade — send its stockpile out of the country for fabrication into fuel rods 
and shut the underground facility at Fordo where the 20 percent enrichment is taking place. (NYT, June, 21, 2012) 
The ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ dichotomy was still observable but to a milder degree from 2012 to 2013, since both countries 
were busy dealing with their presidential elections. With the re-election of president Obama, the same story of imposing 
international sanctions continued. The key influential event seemed to be the Iranian prospective presidential election 
which caused mild modifications in American policies toward Iran with the purpose of helping opposition groups in 
Iran to get around the government to have a better contact with each other and the outside world including America. 
Although this was presented as an advantage to ‘them’ (i.e. Iran), it was in fact considered to be more beneficial to ‘us’. 
Excerpt 3 
The talks ground to a halt last June, as the Iranian issue became mired in the American presidential campaign. But 
now that Mr. Obama has won a second term he seems more willing to join Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China 
in shaping a deal that is more likely to get Iran to curb its nuclear work. (NYT, March, 1, 2013) 
Excerpt 4 
The administration has kept up the pressure by tightening sanctions. Once the (Iran) election is over, it also needs to 
step up diplomatic efforts, testing through intermediaries if there is any willingness by the new president. (NYT, June, 
13, 2013) 
The dichotomy seemed paler from 2013 to 2014 and was replaced by the advantage to ‘public’ (i.e. both ‘us’ and 
‘them’), although the advantage of ‘them’ was explicitly shown to be dependent on the advantage of ‘us’ with the 
purpose of reaching a permanent agreement with Iran on its nuke activities. Moreover, it was believed that the interim 
agreement was the result of American imposed sanctions. 
Excerpt 5 
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Layers of sanctions, imposed separately since 2006 by the United Nations Security Council, the United States and 
Europe, have been largely responsible for moving Iran to the point of serious negotiations…… the proposal on offer 
seems reasonable for each side. It would freeze major parts of Iran’s program for six months and allow some relief on 
sanctions, including access to about $10 billion in Iran’s frozen assets, while a more permanent deal is discussed. (NYT, 
Nov, 15, 2013) 
After the interim agreement of 2013 which was focused on from 2014 to 2015, other useful actions were introduced 
as well including a) suspending some of the sanctions on Iran, b) extending the diplomatic negotiations between Iran 
and P5+1, c) bilateral Iran-U.S. talks, and d) preliminary framework agreement. Furthermore, as it came closer to the 
deadline for negotiations, unity of American officials was regarded as the most useful policy. 
Excerpt 6 
The preliminary agreement between Iran and the major powers is a significant achievement that makes it more likely 
Iran will never be a nuclear threat. President Obama said it would “cut off every pathway that Iran could take to 
develop a nuclear weapon.” (NYT, April, 2, 2015) 
 
TABLE I. 
DISTRIBUTION OF TOPOS OF ADVANTAGE 
Topos of advantage 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
1. imposing tough sanctions on Iran 2 
10.52% 
4 
21.05% 
7 
36.84% 
5 
26.31% 
1 
5.26% 
0 
0% 
19 
100% 
2. military option against Iran 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
50% 
1 
50% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
100% 
3. cooperation of major powers and world nations with US 1 
8.33% 
2 
16.66% 
1 
8.33% 
2 
16.66% 
3 
25% 
3 
25% 
12 
100% 
4. campaign of assassination, bombing, and cyber attack 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
50% 
1 
25% 
1 
25% 
0 
0% 
4 
100% 
5. diplomatic negotiations 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3 
7.89% 
15 
30.94% 
10 
26.31% 
10 
26.31% 
38 
100% 
6. incentives proposal to Iran 1 
3.70% 
1 
3.70% 
5 
19.23% 
5 
19.23% 
6 
23.07% 
9 
30.76% 
27 
100% 
7. interim agreement 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
4 
36.36% 
7 
63.63% 
11 
100% 
8. suspending sanctions on Iran 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
6 
50% 
6 
50% 
12 
100% 
9. transparent nuclear activities of Iran 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3 
37.5% 
2 
25% 
3 
37.5% 
8 
100% 
10. unity of American officials 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
25% 
3 
37.5% 
3 
37.5% 
8 
100% 
11. extending talks 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3 
75% 
1 
25% 
4 
100% 
12. comprehensive nuclear deal 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
8 
44.44% 
10 
55.55% 
18 
100% 
13. preliminary framework agreement 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
5 
100% 
5 
100% 
 
B.  Topos of Disadvantage or Uselessness 
As illustrated in table II, topos of disadvantage implemented from 2010 to 2012 revealed the ideological dichotomy 
of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ but of a different nature. What considered to be useless to ‘us’ were a) the military option against Iran 
since it would produce anti-American reflections around the world and result in a delay in Iran nuke activities instead of 
finalizing it. Moreover, it was believed that military strike could rally Iranians around their government; b) the 
inadequacy of such countries as China, India, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates since they didn’t stop their business 
affair with Iran, and c) participation of UN and 120 other countries in Nonaligned Movement meeting in Tehran since it 
gave Iran the propaganda opportunity to defend its nuclear program. 
Excerpt 7 
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  told reporters on Sunday that while military “options would cause delay” to 
Iran’s nuclear program, “that doesn’t mean the problem is going to go away”. (NYT, April, 9, 2010) 
Excerpt 8 
China has yet to sufficiently crack down on the Chinese firms that still do business with Iran’s sanctioned entities. 
Turkey, India and the United Arab Emirates, a major hub for Iranian commerce, are still too cozy with Tehran. (NYT, 
June, 13, 2011) 
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TABLE II. 
DISTRIBUTION OF PHOTOS OF DISADVANTAGE  
Topos of disadvantage 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
1. imposing tougher sanctions on Iran 2 
9.09% 
2 
9.09% 
2 
9.09% 
8 
36.36% 
4 
18.18% 
4 
18.18% 
22 
100% 
2. no commitment of such countries as Brazil, Turkey,  
Russia, and China with sanctions 
3 
33.33% 
4 
44.44% 
2 
22.22% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
9 
100% 
3. Economic consequences of sanctions to Iran 1 
5.88% 
3 
17.64% 
3 
17.64% 
3 
17.64% 
3 
17.64% 
4 
23.52% 
17 
100% 
4. Iran foreign policies toward regional countries  
such as Syria 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
16.66% 
7 
58.33% 
3 
25% 
12 
100% 
5. military options against Iran 1 
4.76% 
2 
9.52% 
6 
28.57% 
3 
14.28% 
4 
19.04% 
5 
23.80% 
21 
100% 
6. failure of negotiations 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
6 
42.85% 
4 
28.57% 
4 
28.57% 
14 
100% 
7. Congress opposition to president Obama 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3 
20% 
3 
20% 
9 
60% 
15 
100% 
8. Prime minister Netanyahu’s policies toward Iran 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
5 
29.41% 
6 
35.29% 
6 
35.29% 
17 
100% 
9. rejecting a permanent agreement 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
6 
27.27% 
8 
36.36% 
8 
36.36% 
22 
100% 
 
On the other hand, topos of disadvantage to ‘them’ consisted of a) imposing tougher sanctions on Iran and b) 
lengthening of the negotiation procedure, sine it could damage Iran’s economy drastically. However, with the beginning 
of a new round of talks after the re-election of President Obama (Nov, 2012) before the presidential election of Iran 
(June, 2013), it seemed useless to impose tougher sanctions on Iran as it could harm the probable negotiated deal. 
After the election of President Rouhani, and with the emergence of crisis in Syria, what was mentioned as being 
unfavourable to ‘us’ consisted of such issues as a) imposing tougher sanction on Iran since it could send away Iran form 
negotiation and put America under international blame, and b) Iran policies toward Syria with its possible threat to 
Israel (i.e. America’s ally). On the other hand, rejecting a permanent agreement with the West was assumed to be highly 
disadvantageous to Iran (i.e. them). It can be clearly inferred that our disadvantage (the west) considered to be superior 
to their disadvantage (Iran). So, the dichotomy was still observable. After the interim agreement, the disadvantages to 
both us and them were considered to be a) failure of diplomatic negotiations, b) Israel extremist policies toward Iran, c) 
congress opposition to president Obama’s policies, and d) rejecting a permanent deal. 
C.  Topos of Danger or Threat  
The argumentative strategy of threat (see table III) implemented in the 2010-2012 time duration fell into three 
subcategories. a) There was an attempt to display the threatening side of Iran’s nuclear program which was expected to 
result in nuclear warhead production; although, none of them proved the existence of such nuclear weapons and just 
their possibility of production was discussed. b) Iran’s threat to shut the strait of Hurmoz, and to retaliate the death of its 
nuclear scientists were represented as a danger to the West. c) The threat of Israel attack to Iran was mentioned as a sign 
of disagreement between Mr. Obama and Mr. Netanyahu just before the American presidential election. To cool it 
down, then it was claimed that Iran had not been on the verge of producing a weapon and that the United Nations 
inspectors would warn before it got to that point, which was in sharp contrast with what they had claimed before about 
the level of nuclear activities in Iran. 
Excerpt 9 
The latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency is a chilling reminder of both the scale of Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions and the lengths it will go to cover up the truth. The agency expressed strong concern about Iran’s 
“past or current undisclosed nuclear related activities” with “possible military dimensions.” (NYT, Sep, 16, 2011) 
Excerpt 10 
Tehran’s nuclear ambitions are clearly dangerous to Israel and the region. But the administration argues that Iran is 
not on the verge of producing a weapon and that the United Nations inspectors will provide warning before it gets to 
that point. (NYT, Aug, 27, 2012) 
Due to the re-election of president Obama and more emphasis on Iranian presidential election, a shift of focus 
occurred to emphasize other challenges and possible dangers of Iran to the west and specially Israel. Iran was regarded 
as a threat to Israel not only because of its nuke activities, but also because of its support of Hezbollah and president 
Bashar al-Assad of Syria. Moreover, the direction of threat had been changed to target Iran’s interim agreement in an 
attempt to make Iran aware of the dangers of rejecting the permanent agreement with major powers on its nuclear 
activities. 
Excerpt 11 
No country feels more threatened by Iran than Israel, and its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, is clearly 
unhappy with the American-Iranian thaw. In addition to having a nuclear program, Iran is the main backer of 
Hezbollah and has provided arms and fighters to President Bashar al-Assad of Syria. (NYT, Sep, 28, 2013) 
Excerpt 12 
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After the interim agreement (2013), some other threats were added including the failure of diplomatic negotiations 
which would in turn lead to other dangers such as imposing tougher sanctions or military attacks. On the other hand, 
American congress policies ware considered as another threatening source. 
Excerpt 13 
The best and only practical way to restrain Iran from developing a bomb is through negotiating a strict agreement 
with tough monitoring. In rejecting diplomacy, the Republicans make an Iranian bomb and military conflict more likely. 
(NYT, March, 11, 2015) 
 
TABLE III. 
DISTRIBUTION OT TOPOS OF DANGER 
Topos of threat 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
1. Iran’s production of nuclear warheads 1 
4.54% 
5 
22.72% 
3 
13.63% 
3 
13.63% 
5 
22.72% 
5 
22.72% 
22 
100% 
2. Iran’s threat to the region specially Israel 1 
4.16% 
4 
16.66% 
6 
25% 
3 
12.50% 
4 
16.66% 
6 
25% 
24 
100% 
3. Israel’s military attack to Iran 0 
0% 
1 
5.88% 
7 
41.17% 
2 
11.76% 
2 
11.76% 
6 
35.29% 
17 
100% 
4. imposing tougher economic sanctions in case of  
failure of agreement 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
10% 
3 
30% 
3 
30% 
3 
30% 
10 
100% 
5. failure of negotiations 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
12 
75% 
2 
12.5% 
2 
12.5% 
16 
100% 
6. Congress political activities  0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3 
16.66% 
5 
27.77% 
10 
55.55% 
18 
100% 
 
D.  Topos of Reality 
Throughout the periods under the study, what has been expressed repeatedly as a matter of reality was Iran’s decision 
to produce nuclear bombs and uranium enrichment to a near bomb grade. It was argued that the least dangerous way is 
to put Iran under economic pressure through different sorts of sanctions internationally. To this end, international 
agreement with imposing sanction on Iran made this decision a more reasonable one. Nevertheless, Russia and China 
were represented as Iranian partners separated from international community temporarily from 2010 to 2012. 
Excerpt 14 
While Russian and Chinese leaders told Mr. Obama that they will work seriously on new sanctions, diplomats say 
their representatives are already seeking ways to elute any resolutions. (NYT, April, 19. 2010) 
Excerpt 15 
The report is chillingly comprehensive. It says that Iran created computer models of nuclear explosions, conducted 
experiments on nuclear triggers and did advanced research on a warhead that could be delivered by a medium-range 
missile. (NYT, Nov, 9, 2011) 
Table IV illustrates the strategies applied in this section. As it is shown, after Iranian presidential election (2013), a 
shift of focus emerged in the application of topos of reality. From then on, the changes in Iran’s foreign diplomacy in 
addition to the inefficiency of the sanctions to slow down Iran’s nuclear program were presented to persuade the public 
opinion to believe in the supremacy of diplomatic negotiations. 
However, other political challenges with Iran, Israel’s demand for complete dismantlement of nuclear activities, 
congress insistence on imposing tougher sanctions, and disagreement of Saudi Arabia with nuclear deal were presented 
as other matters of reality shackling the process of negotiations with Iran. Finally, it was concluded that sanctions and 
several round of negotiations had not produced positive results. Therefore, it conveyed to the readers’ mind that since 
all possible diplomatic ways are tested, if Iran doesn’t accept a nuclear deal, what remains might be the military option. 
Excerpt 16 
It is disappointing that recently toughened sanctions and several rounds of negotiations have not produced positive 
results. (NYT, Aug, 27, 2013) 
Excerpt 17 
America and its allies are right to be sceptical, but the only rational course is to test Iran’s intentions through 
negotiations....Congress can always impose more sanctions then. (NYT, Nov, 15, 2013) 
Excerpt 18 
Mr. Netanyahu has two main objections. One is that an agreement would not force Iran to dismantle its nuclear 
facilities ..... Two, that a deal to severely restrict Iran’s ability to produce nuclear fuel for a decade or more is not long 
enough..... Despite his commitment to negotiations, President Obama has repeatedly said he would never let Iran 
obtain a nuclear weapon and if an agreement is not honored, he would take action to back up his warning. (NYT, 
March, 3, 2015) 
Excerpt 19 
Sunni Arab nations and Israel are deeply opposed to any deal, fearing that it would strengthen Iran’s power in the 
region… Iran is widely seen as a threat; whether it can get beyond that will depend on whether its leaders choose to be 
less hostile to its neighbors, including Israel. (NYT, April, 2, 2015) 
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TABLE IV. 
DISTRIBUTION OF TOPOS OF REALITY  
Topos of reality 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
1. possibility of producing nuclear bombs by Iran 1 
5.55% 
4 
22.22% 
4 
22.22% 
3 
16.66% 
3 
16.66% 
3 
16.66% 
18 
100% 
2. uranium enrichment to a near-bomb grade 3 
17.64% 
3 
17.64% 
7 
41.17% 
2 
11.76% 
1 
5.88% 
1 
5.88% 
17 
100% 
3. effectiveness of sanctions 4 
11.11% 
2 
5.55% 
6 
16.66% 
8 
22.22% 
8 
22.22% 
8 
22.22% 
36 
100% 
4. agreement of other countries to impose sanctions on Iran 9 
64.28% 
2 
14.28% 
1 
7.14% 
0 
0% 
1 
7.14% 
1 
7.14% 
14 
100% 
5. cooperation of Russia and China with Iran 3 
37.5% 
4 
50% 
1 
12.5% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
8 
100% 
6. Israel’s military option against Iran 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
5 
45.45% 
2 
18.18% 
2 
18.18% 
2 
18.18% 
11 
100% 
7. exaggeration about Iran’s nuclear power 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
5 
62.5% 
3 
37.5% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
8 
100% 
8. inadequacy of sanctions 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
33.33% 
0 
0% 
2 
33.33% 
2 
33.33% 
6 
100% 
9. a change in Iran’s diplomacy 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3 
33.33% 
3 
33.33% 
3 
33.33% 
9 
100% 
10. modest sanction relief 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
6 
42.85% 
4 
28.57% 
4 
28.57% 
14 
100% 
11. superiority of diplomatic negotiation 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3 
21.42% 
3 
21.42% 
8 
57.14% 
14 
100% 
12. tougher sanctions in case of failure of negotiations 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3 
37.5% 
5 
62.5% 
8 
100% 
13. other political challenges with Iran 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
4 
50% 
4 
50% 
8 
100% 
14. political challenges between Netanyahu and Obama 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3 
33.33% 
6 
66.66% 
9 
100% 
15. American’s security commitment to Israel 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
40% 
3 
60% 
5 
100% 
16. Israel’s unrealistic demands 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
18.18% 
4 
36.36% 
5 
45.45% 
11 
100% 
17. disagreement of Sunni Arab nations with nuclear deal 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
25% 
1 
25% 
2 
50% 
4 
100% 
 
E.  Topos of History 
Historical argumentation, applied in the era of 2010-2012, targeted the inadequacy of U.N. inspectors, American 
intelligence agencies, and the Security Council sanctions to identify and control Iran’s nuclear program. It criticized the 
efficiency of negotiation approach put forward by Russia and IAEA. Furthermore, it emphasized the effectiveness of 
president Obama’s success in rallying the major powers to impose sanctions on Iran which pointed to the superiority of 
his policies toward Iran in comparison with what had been done previously by President Bush. 
Excerpt 20 
The critics neglect to mention that Iran’s program grew significantly when George W. Bush was president and 
opportunities were lost to constrain it at a much lower level. No president has been as successful as Mr. Obama in 
rallying the major powers to impose sanctions with bite. These are the first serious nuclear talks in years, and there is 
still time to let them run. (NYT, June, 21, 2012) 
The historical argumentation in 2013-2015 period was of a different nature. It concentrated on the hostile relationship 
and mistrust between Iran and America before the election of president Rouhani and praised the new opportunity of a 
direct contact between the two countries. On the other hand, the history of Iran nuke activities was reviewed to put more 
emphasis on a) the mistrust to Iran, b) recent achievements in controlling it through sanctions and c) the benefits of the 
interim agreement (see table V). After the preliminary framework agreement (April, 2, 2015), President Obama’s 
diplomatic negotiation policy was compared to his previous counterparts, Ronald Reagan and Richard Nixon, to 
increase its credibility and value. 
Excerpt 21 
There is good reason for skepticism about Iran’s intentions. Although it pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons 
when it ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1970, it pursued a secret uranium enrichment program for two 
decades. By November 2013, when serious negotiations with the major powers began, Iran was enriching uranium at a 
level close to bomb-grade. (NYT, April,2, 2015) 
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TABLE V. 
DISTRIBUTION OF TOPOS OF HISTORY  
Topos of history 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
1. inadequacy of UN Security Council  5 
45.45% 
6 
54.54% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
11 
100% 
2. inadequacy of sanctions 3 
27.27% 
4 
36.36% 
1 
9.09% 
1 
9.09% 
1 
9.09% 
1 
9.09% 
11 
100% 
3. hostility between  Iran and America 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
5 
41.66% 
3 
25% 
4 
33.33% 
12 
100% 
4. fragility of American credibility after Iraq war 0 
0% 
2 
50% 
0 
0% 
2 
50% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
4 
100% 
5. previous American military actions  0 
0% 
1 
33.33% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
66.66% 
3 
100% 
6. mistrust to Iran 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
4 
22.22% 
4 
22.22% 
4 
22.22% 
6 
33.33% 
18 
100% 
7.failure of previous American administration 2 
25% 
1 
12.5% 
1 
12.5% 
2 
25% 
1 
12.5% 
1 
12.5% 
8 
100% 
8. effectiveness of sanctions since 2006 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3 
17.64% 
6 
35.29% 
8 
47.05% 
17 
100% 
9. review of Iran nuke activities 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3 
50% 
3 
50% 
6 
100% 
10. effectiveness of interim agreement 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
3 
33.33% 
6 
66.66% 
9 
100% 
11. success of previous American presidents in other negotiations 0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
100% 
2 
100% 
 
V.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
With regard to the first research question, the results reveals that the NYT has given a systematic biased treatment to 
the participants involved in Iran’s nuclear program, one which is supported by its ideology of applying more sanctions 
on Iran in order to force it to accept a permanent agreement. Iran has been given the image of a criminal who has tried 
to escape from international sanctions against its so-called illegal nuke activities. In this way, the findings are in line 
with those of Behnam and Zenouz (2008) where they maintain the misrepresentation of Iran nuke program and 
Persephobia were reflected in the British paper, the Economist. Iran is attributed as being uncooperative with IAEA 
inspectors, in the process of producing nuclear weapon, and a risk to the world peace. Dunmire (2005) calls this 
discourse manoeuvre a “projected event: a state of affairs that claims will occur at some point in the near future” (p.221). 
Iran is represented as a country besieged by political, social, and economic problems with no respect to human rights, 
which support the findings of the studies done by Rasti and Sahragard (2012), Atai and Mozaheb (2013),Sahragard and 
Rasti (2014), and Jones (2014). 
Considering the second research question, before the American presidential election, the NYT focused on a) the 
threatening side of Iran to the region and world security, b) the inefficiency of UN and Security Council in controlling 
Iran’s nuclear program, and c) the necessity of an international decision to impose tough sanctions on Iran. This way, it 
prepared the ground for the emergence of a saviour that is president Obama.  After the re-election of Mr Obama, the 
paper emphasized on a) the success of president Obama in uniting the major powers against Iran and b) the 
effectiveness of sanctions against Iran. Meanwhile, another important political issue influenced the NYT’s application 
of argumentative strategies and that was the Iranian presidential election (2013), before which a) Iran’s nuclear 
activities and uranium enrichment, and b) threat of military attack to Iran were focused on repeatedly. The only 
recommended solution was Iran’s decision to stop its nuclear programs and engage in negotiations over the issue. After 
the election of Mr Rouhani, the paper spotlighted a) the inefficiency of sanctions, b) disadvantage of military attack to 
Iran and d) the new opportunity for diplomatic negotiations. However, after the interim agreement between Iran and 
P5+1 countries, this success was attributed to president Obama’s policy of imposing sanctions and diplomatic 
negotiations. On the other hand, it passed the buck to Iran for possible failure of reaching a permanent agreement by 
pointing to the history of hostile relationship with and mistrust to Iran. 
The NYT has left nearly all discussions of other countries with nuclear weapons as unrelated to the issue at hand, this 
is in line with findings of Izadi and Saghaye-Biria (2007) in assuming that whereas Iran’s violation of its NPT 
commitment is important and threatening to the world and regional stability, the failure of other countries such as 
America and Israel toward the eradication of actual nuclear weapons is out of discussion. 
Furthermore, the issue of Iran’s nuclear program is illustrated to be related to other irrelevant issues which mainly 
include Iran's domestic and international challenges such as presidential election and supporting the Syrian government 
and Hezbollah. Accordingly, the argumentative strategies are not used fairly in the political discourse of the paper.  It 
can be concluded that the NYT has provided its readers as gloomy an image of Iran as it can to persuade the readers 
from around the world to advocate the policy of applying more pressure on Iran.  
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